Blog Mentions:
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly's 2013 symposium on Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics and human gene patenting was picked up by IP Watchdog

Debra Burns's note Too Big to Fail and Too Big to Pay: States, Their Public-Pension Bills, and the Constitution was mentioned on Wills, Trusts & Estates Blog

Volume 40/Volume 41:
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly is working on its final installment of Volume 40 as the new Volume 41 team gets prepared to take over at the end of the academic year.

HCLQ at the Supreme Court:
In his recent concurrence in Maryland v. Shatzer, Justice Stevens referred to Marcy Strauss's essay in Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly, titled Reinterrogation, for the proposition that reapprehension after being released from custody may heighten the inherent compulsion of police interrogation. Shatzer restricted the holding of Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), which established the rule that a suspect who has invoked his or her right to the presence of counsel during custodial interrogation is not subject to further interrogation until either counsel has been made available or the suspect initiates exchanges with the police. Shatzer held that Edwards does not apply if a break in custody lasting 14 days has occurred and that a suspect's return to the general prison population after invoking the right to counsel constitutes a break in custody. See Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S.Ct. 1213, 1231 n.9 (2010) (J. Stevens concurring) (citing Marcy Strauss, Reinterrogation, 22 Hastings Const. L.Q. 359, 390 (1995)).

Justice Stevens also cited Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly in his opinion, dissenting in part and concurring in part, in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, which held, in part, that federal campaign financing statutes that restricted independent corporate expenditures for electioneering communications violated the First Amendment. Justice Stevens, dissenting to that holding, cited Autonomy, Debate, and Corporate Speech, by David Shelledy, for the proposition that at the time the First Amendment was ratified, all corporate activities were regarded as resting "entirely in a concession of the sovereign." See Citizens United v. Federal Election Com'n, 130 S.Ct. 876, 950 (2010) (J. Stevens dissenting in part and concurring in part) (citing David Shelledy, Autonomy, Debate, and Corporate Speech, 18 Hastings Const. L.Q. 541, 578 (1991)).